Book Review: Philosophy of Social Science (Second Edition)

The following is a detailed and analytical review of Philosophy of Social Science (Second Edition) by Ted Benton and Ian Craib.

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Book Review: Philosophy of Social Science (Second Edition)

Authors: Ted Benton and Ian Craib

Main Themes, Arguments, and Author’s Purpose

Philosophy of Social Science (Second Edition) serves primarily as a concise introduction and "language primer" to the philosophical traditions and contentious arguments surrounding the study of human social life. The central purpose of the work is to encourage students of social science to engage in reflexive inquiry by addressing the fundamental question: "What are we doing when we attempt to study human social life in a systematic way?". The authors, drawing on a long history of intellectual collaboration and debate, present a complex, nuanced picture of the social sciences, arguing that philosophical questions are not externally imposed but arise intrinsically from the "special difficulties and deep disagreements" found within the disciplines themselves.

The main arguments revolve around charting the philosophical terrain (epistemology, ontology, logic, ethics) and navigating the perennial tension between naturalistic (positivist) approaches that model social science on natural science, and anti-naturalistic (interpretivist) approaches that emphasize meaning, culture, and subjectivity.

Crucially, the book argues against a simple dichotomy, dedicating significant space to developing and defending alternative, post-empiricist models of science, notably Critical Realism, which seeks to overcome the sterile opposition between meaning and cause, or particular versus universal methods. The authors frame their endeavor as "underlabouring" for the social sciences—providing clarity, criticizing prejudices, mapping existing knowledge, and refining methods.

Chapter-by-Chapter Breakdown

The book is structured to move logically from traditional philosophical debates concerning natural science toward contemporary debates specifically within social theory, before returning to a synthesis in the context of critical realism and critique.

Part I: The Natural Science Model and Its Critics (Chapters 1–4)

• Chapter 1 (Introduction): Establishes the necessity of philosophy, detailing the "masterbuilder" versus "underlabourer" views. It introduces the "philosophical toolkit": Epistemology (the theory of knowledge, contrasting rationalism and empiricism), Ontology (the theory of what exists, contrasting materialism and idealism), Logic, and Ethics/Moral Philosophy.
• Chapter 2 (Empiricism and Positivism in Science): Outlines the empiricist account of knowledge through seven basic doctrines, emphasizing testability, the reliance on observation/experiment, and the 'covering law' model of explanation. Positivism is characterized by extending these methods to the study of social life (naturalism) and the notion of "social engineering". A strength of this chapter is its clear demarcation of key concepts, but it highlights the inherent difficulty in drawing a clear dividing line between science and 'pseudo-science' using strict testability criteria.
• Chapter 3 (Some Problems of Empiricism and Positivism): This chapter provides extensive critiques of empiricism, highlighting that observations are conceptually mediated ("theory dependence of observation"). It tackles the problem of induction and notes the distinction between confirmation and Popper’s falsification. It discusses incommensurability (rival theories talking past each other). A key strength is the introduction of different roles for theory: functional, historical-narrative, and the hypothetico-deductive model, which challenges the empiricist "flat ontology" by suggesting reality is layered.
• Chapter 4 (Science, Nature and Society: Some Alternatives to Empiricism): Reviews post-empiricist alternatives, emphasizing the social and historical location of science. Key ideas include the Frankfurt School's critique (science as domination), Merton’s institutional imperatives for science, the French tradition of Historical Epistemology (epistemological breaks), Kuhn’s concept of the paradigm and scientific revolutions, and the Strong Programme (impartiality and symmetry). A weakness is noted in the early formulation of Actor-Network Theory, which tended toward cynicism and rejected reason itself.

Part II: Interpretive Approaches (Chapters 5–7)

These chapters explore the arguments that social sciences must adopt distinct methods due to the nature of their objects (self-conscious, reflexive human beings).

• Chapter 5 (Interpretive Approaches 1: Instrumental Rationality): Focuses on instrumental rationality (action directed towards practical, achievable ends). The pivotal thinker is Max Weber, who defined the object of sociology as "meaningful, rational, social action" and used ideal types and verstehen (interpretive understanding). Weber's criteria for judgment are meaning adequacy and causal adequacy (through comparative analysis). Related approaches include Phenomenology (Schutz’s typifications/second-order typifications), and Rational Choice Theory (maximizing profit/benefits). The strength lies in establishing the hermeneutic starting point, although the chapter notes the inherent difficulty in equating reasons with causes.
• Chapter 6 (Interpretive Approaches 2: Rationality as Rule-Following): Moves beyond individual meaning to collective culture. Peter Winch's influential argument, rooted in Wittgenstein, states that concepts settle the form of experience and that social life is rule-following. Since rules can be followed wrongly or rightly, social action cannot be understood through causal explanations. The chapter explores the resulting relativism and introduces Alisdair MacIntyre’s emphasis on morality rooted in tradition and human life understood through narratives. Finally, Gadamer’s Hermeneutics stresses the historical nature of understanding and the hermeneutic circle (part-to-whole movement). A weakness is Gadamer’s potential conservatism and overemphasis on the authority of tradition, which hinders the critique of ideologies.
• Chapter 7 (Interpretive Approaches 3: Critical Rationality): Focuses on critique and emancipation. It introduces the Dialectic (Hegel/Marx) and the Frankfurt School's concept of Ideology (systematically distorted ideas, resulting in "second nature"). Habermas attempts a synthesis, organizing social scientific approaches around three cognitive interests (technical, practical, emancipatory). Habermas's model—which posits the ideal speech situation and communicative rationality as democratic standards—offers a strong alternative to relativism.

Part III: New Directions (Chapters 8–10) and Conclusion

• Chapter 8 (Critical Realism and the Social Sciences): Presents Critical Realism (CR) as a non-positivist, yet realist alternative. CR asserts that reality is stratified (real/mechanisms, actual/events, empirical/observations) and differentiates between the intransitive dimension (independent reality) and the transitive dimension (conceptual, social process of knowledge production). It advocates a critical naturalism for social science. Crucially, it proposes the transformational model of social action to resolve the structure/agency problem, and argues that knowledge can support emancipation through explanatory critique (identifying social structures that cause suffering or false beliefs).
• Chapter 9 (Feminism, Knowledge and Society): Examines the challenges posed by feminism to traditional epistemology, especially regarding objectivity and universality. It contrasts Feminist Empiricism with Feminist Standpoint Epistemology (S. Harding, H. Rose, N. Hartsock), which argues that marginalized social positions yield more adequate knowledge (a critique of "malestream" science). The chapter notes the internal feminist critique from Post-modern Feminism, which rejects the universal category "woman" and epistemology itself.
• Chapter 10 (Post-structuralism and Post-modernism): Examines the shift from structuralism (underlying structures, linguistic analogy) to Post-structuralism (Foucault's discourse/power-knowledge and Derrida's deconstruction/logocentrism). Post-modernism (Lyotard) denies the possibility of meta-narratives, emphasizing fragmentation, plurality, and skepticism toward foundational truths. The critical reflection here acknowledges the 'posts' intellectual provocation but argues that the abandonment of reason is self-refuting, as critique must employ the Enlightenment principles it denies.
• Chapter 11 (Conclusion: In Defence of Philosophy): Re-emphasizes the complexity of the social world, advocating for intellectual life beyond simple instrumental thinking. It argues that philosophical reflection on scientific practice justifies key distinctions, such as critical realism’s transitive/intransitive dimensions, and asserts that social structures exist independently of our concepts.
• Chapter 12 (Commentary on Recent Developments): Added by Benton for the Second Edition (Ian Craib having died in 2002). This chapter provides explicit critical commentary, particularly focusing on the debate surrounding Peter Winch's anti-scientism and discussing the development of post-Marxist discourse theory (Glynos and Howarth). It highlights the proliferation of work in the critical realist tradition since the first edition, including debates on methodology, the structure/agency problem, and Bhaskar's "spiritual turn".

Historical and Intellectual Context

The book is deeply rooted in the intellectual ferment following the Enlightenment, dealing directly with the legacies of Rationalism and Empiricism. The authors’ intellectual biographies place them in the generation of the "sixties," sharing an initial strong political and moral commitment, particularly to Marxism. This background meant they were concerned throughout their careers with adapting social theory to the massive intellectual and political challenges presented by movements such as feminism, environmentalism, and anti-racism. The philosophical differences between the authors—Ian Craib’s focus on subjectivity, psychoanalysis, and anti-naturalism, and Ted Benton’s commitment to naturalism, critical realism, and life sciences—structured the book’s division of labor and its pervasive internal debate.

The book’s structure reflects the movement in philosophy of social science away from the mid-20th-century dominance of logical positivism and the rise of alternatives like post-Kuhnian philosophy of science, which emphasizes the social practice of science.

Relevance Today: The relevance of the book remains high because it addresses persistent issues: the tension between scientific explanation and human meaning, the role of values in objective research, and the possibility of rational critique in a relativistic world. Chapter 12 ensures contemporary relevance by engaging with recent developments in critical realism and post-structuralism/post-Marxism, showing how these theoretical traditions continue to evolve and clash.

Evaluation of Author’s Style, Clarity, and Use of Evidence

The authors successfully achieve the tone of a comprehensive "primer" and "map" of the field. The writing maintains a "careful and respectful attitude to alternative points of view". Ian Craib’s contributions are lauded for their ability to communicate complex and difficult ideas in a direct and accessible way, capturing the "sense of excitement and bewilderment" of intellectual exploration.

The use of evidence is primarily conceptual and historical. The authors meticulously reconstruct the intellectual journeys that led to key philosophical stances (e.g., tracing Kantian ideas to Weberian methodology, or Lukácsian ideas to feminist standpoint theory). They employ transcendental arguments (Bhaskar) as evidence for ontological claims about reality. They use concrete examples—like Darwin’s natural selection, the ambiguity of visual perception, or the Azande witchcraft debate—to make abstract philosophical points clear. The critical reflection notes that the book "depends on a real philosophical argument" rather than empirical investigation of any single discipline, enhancing its role as a work of philosophy.

Comparison with Other Works

The book positions itself as a companion to foundational theoretical texts and introduces multiple traditions concisely. By systematically reviewing and critiquing Empiricism (Popper, Ayer) and Positivism (Comte, Durkheim), before diving into interpretive traditions (Weber, Winch, Gadamer, Habermas), the book covers the territory expected of a philosophy of social science text.

However, its strength lies in moving beyond the traditional positivism/hermeneutics binary by promoting post-empiricist, non-reductive approaches, specifically Critical Realism. In doing so, it engages with contemporary social theory (e.g., Giddens's structuration theory, which is discussed as a different approach to the structure/agency problem than the critical realist transformational model). It explicitly compares its mission to the foundational philosophical work of thinkers like Gramsci.

Critical Reflection and Target Audience

The greatest contribution of Philosophy of Social Science is its rigorous argument for sustained philosophical reflection within the social sciences, demonstrating that the deepest methodological disputes stem from fundamental disagreements over epistemology and ontology. It contributes significantly by showing that natural science itself is not monolithic, allowing for the possibility of a "scientific" social study that rejects the narrow, surface-level focus of traditional positivism.

The book's refusal to offer settled conclusions, instead inviting the reader to participate in the debate—to "argue against yourself from alternative points of view"—is a key strength. It makes the powerful case that intellectual life and the struggle for understanding are themselves inherently valuable and emancipatory.

Target Readers and Researchers: The book is ideal for students and apprentices to the social sciences. It specifically benefits those seeking a framework to:

1. Situate their discipline within wider philosophical traditions (e.g., sociology, economics, history, psychology).
2. Understand the philosophical foundations of competing theoretical approaches, such as rational choice theory, feminism, or post-structuralism.
3. Engage in advanced research by clarifying methodological presuppositions, particularly those seeking to integrate meaning/interpretation with causal/structural explanation (e.g., researchers interested in Critical Realism, critical theory, or issues of power and ideology).
4. Reflect critically on the moral and political implications of their work, moving beyond simple factual investigation to normative evaluation.